What's Wrong with Freeport's Security PolicyPublished by MAC on 2002-10-21
What's Wrong with Freeport's Security Policy?
Summary Report: Results of Investigation into the Attack on Freeport Employees in Timika, Papua, Finds Corporation Allows Impunity of Criminal Acts by Indonesian Armed Forces by ELSHAM
October 21, 2002
I. Introduction: Brief Historical Context of Papua, Indonesia and Freeport
Situated on the western half of New Guinea, the world's second-largest island, Papua (formerly known as Irian Jaya) has been occupied by a series of foreign powers for much of the past few centuries, including Dutch colonial administration, Japanese military occupation during World War II, liberation by General MacArthur's American troops, and Indonesian military and civil authority today.
Papua's current status as Indonesia's 26th province has its origins in a United Nations-sponsored process, initiated with strong backing from the United States' Kennedy Administration in the early 1960s, through which the territory was transferred from Dutch colonial administration to Indonesian control. Indigenous Papuans were excluded from the negotiations, which culminated in the 1962 New York Agreement, a bi-lateral agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia. They were shut out once again seven years later when Indonesia conducted the 1969 Act of Free Choice (AFC), held to satisfy the New York Agreement's requirement of a formal "act of self-determination." Controversial amongst diplomats and other observers, international legal scholars and Papuans themselves, the AFC prompted protests from the U.N.'s chief observer and delegates to the U.N. General Assembly, who cited an atmosphere of repression in which the Indonesian government violated Papuans' rights of free speech, movement, and assembly, and continuously exercised "tight political control over the population."
Papua, together with the independent nation state of Papua New Guinea on the island's eastern half, is the planet's most culturally and biologically diverse place. The island is home to 1,000 different language groups (one-fourth of the world's total), with 250 of these located within Papua's borders. Since its integration into Indonesia, Papua's cultural make-up has shifted significantly. Papua's indigenous population of 1.5 million people now shares the territory with 1 million Indonesian migrants. Indigenous Papuans are predominantly Christian and racially Melanesian, while the new arrivals are predominantly Muslim and of Asian descent. Hundreds of thousands of the migrants have been sponsored by the Indonesian government's discredited transmigration program, others are spontaneous migrants such as traders from the Indonesian island of Sulawesi.
Papua, which is the size of California, also has the largest contiguous expanse of tropical rainforest outside of the Amazon and has the largest number of endemic species anywhere on earth. Its snow-capped mountain chain - rising to heights of 16,000 feet above sea level, the highest between the Himalayas and the Andes - is rich in deposits of gold and copper, and reserves of natural gas and oil elsewhere within the territory are under exploitation by transnational corporations, including BP Amoco.
Taking advantage of Papua's rich mineral resources, New Orleans-based corporation Freeport McMoRan is the majority owner and operator of the world's largest gold and copper mining operation, located in the southwestern region of Papua. Years before Papua came under official Indonesian sovereignty, Freeport began contractual negotiations with the Indonesian government to exploit the Papuan mineral deposits, signing a deal in 1967.
In the high-stakes context of Cold War politics and multi-billion dollar contracts, the 1969 Act of Free Choice predictably confirmed Papua's status as a territory of Indonesia and the right of Papuans to self-determination was sacrificed for the sake of realpolitik. During the past four decades of Indonesian "integration," indigenous Papuans have experienced all forms of mistreatment, human rights abuses, environmental destruction and political oppression.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the area of Timika, the mining town created by Freeport. Since 1967, two years before Papua officially became part of Indonesia, Freeport, in coalition with the Indonesian government, has acquired approximately 2.6 million hectares of land traditionally owned by local tribes without consideration of the locals' rights, the social, economic, political, and cultural consequences, or paying adequate compensation. In addition to these problems, Freeport's operations have caused extensive environmental destruction to the area's fragile alpine and tropical rainforest ecosystems.
Since the mid-1990s, Freeport's Papua mining operation has dumped an average of 200,000 tons of "tailings" (mining waste) into local rivers every day. This practice, condemned by fellow mining giant, BHP, and the World Bank, and illegal in most countries, has destroyed and contaminated local food sources resulting in sickness, poisoning, starvation and death amongst the local indigenous population. Freeport now claims that its destruction of coastal rainforest is part of the plan and has designated a 100 kilometer "sacrifice zone."
In 1995, reacting to the danger Freeport's mining operation has inflicted on the environment and human health, the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) revoked Freeport's $100 million political risk insurance, concluding that the mine had "created and continues to pose unreasonable or major environmental, health or safety hazards with respect to the rivers that are being impacted by the tailings, the surrounding terrestrial ecosystem, and the local inhabitants."
Equally distressing are the crimes against humanity being perpetrated by the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI) and government since Papua's integration into Indonesia, with estimates that more than 100,000 Papuans (almost 10 percent of the indigenous population) have been killed or have gone 'missing' as a result of extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances, while several times that number have experienced torture, rape and intimidation at the hands of the Indonesian armed forces. In this atmosphere of repression, the Indonesian security forces (TNI and Police) have provided protection for Freeport's mine since the beginning of operations there.
Investigations by Indonesia's National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM) and church groups have documented severe human rights violations in and around the Freeport mining area perpetrated by the military. In 1995, Komnas HAM publicly stated that these human rights abuses "are directly connected to [the Indonesian army].acting as protection for the mining business of PT Freeport Indonesia." The Catholic Church reports that torture and sexual harassment were conducted in Freeport shipping containers, the Army Commander's Mess area, the police station and at Freeport Security Posts. Despite these well-documented reports, Freeport management continues to employ the services of the Indonesian armed forces and to fund the military's presence in Papua.
Indeed, the Indonesian military has a documented history of orchestrating past incidents of destabilizing violence in the area of Freeport's mining operations. For example, in 1994, armed forces battalions 752 and 733, posing as Kelly Kwalik's TPN/OPM unit, shot and killed a Freeport employee on the road near Mile 62. An Australian employee was shot and wounded in the same incident. In March 1996, the military orchestrated a "riot" that caused the closure of the mining operation for three days. This led to an exponential increase in the number of troops based in the area.
The shooting by unidentified gunmen on August 31, 2002, at mile 62-63 along the road from Timika to the Freeport mining enclave of Tembagapura, in which two American citizens and one Indonesian citizen were killed and 12 others were injured is a demonstration of the strength of militarism and impunity in Indonesia and calls into question relations between Freeport McMoRan, PT Freeport Indonesia (Freeport's Indonesian subsidiary) and the military.
The August 31 attack is reminiscent of previous military assaults on Freeport employees and the military's other destructive acts directed at the company and highlights the serious and persistent problems with Freeport's security policy, and Freeport corporate management's failure to hold accountable perpetrators of these criminal acts.
II. The Shootings at Mile 62-63
(a) Background of Events Leading Up to the Shootings & the Peace Mission
In the months leading up to the August 31 shooting, the Indonesian military had initiated many efforts to create a conflict-conducive atmosphere. Plans of an attack on Freeport issued by indigenous Papuan leader and former school teacher Kelly Kwalik to his TPN/OPM group at the beginning of August had put Freeport Security, under chief security officer Lexy Linturan's orders, on high alert.
At the same time, since March 2002, indigenous Papuans' concerns about the escalating threat of an Indonesian military and police crackdown led civil society groups including ELSHAM to pursue urgently an initiative on conflict resolution. The groups set up a Peace Task Force in July 2002, inviting Indonesian civil and military authorities as well as TPN/OPM leaders to enter a dialogue to establish Papua as a Zone of Peace. The culmination of the first stage of the Zone of Peace process was a conference on peace for Papua, co-sponsored by the governor, police chief and the provincial parliament together with ELSHAM and other civil society groups and held in Jayapura, October 15-16, 2002. Major General Mahidi Simbolon, regional commander of the Indonesian military in Papua, was the only official who refused to participate in the initiative.
As part of the Zone of Peace initiative, the Task Force separately met with Papua's police chief, chairman of the provincial parliament, and governor as well as all TPN/OPM leaders, including Nico Hipohauw, Hans R Yoweni, Melkianus Awon, Tadius Yogi, and most importantly, on August 25, 2002, with Kelly Kwalik, all with very successful responses. As a result of these discussions, Kwalik called off attacks on Freeport and showed his commitment to creating and maintaining a peaceful Papua.
Regardless of the peace initiative or its results, there had been an increase in military activity, with certain groups within the Indonesian military manipulating and promoting Kwalik's plan of attack. Indeed, the day before the shooting, on August 30, there had been a joint armed forces operation including the army (Kostrad), special forces (Kopassus), marines and police special forces (Brimob) in the area. There was also terror and intimidation of the local community at the hands of military, police and other groups operating in the area. Such terror and intimidation was in the form of rumors of Dracula sightings in Timika and other violent criminal acts perpetrated by unidentified armed groups suspected of links with Laskar Jihad, Red and White Militias, and elements of Satgas Pam. These incidents directed at Freeport personnel and local indigenous Papuans had been escalating since December 2001, including:
- a May 25, 2002, attack on Freeport's main office building in the company's Western-style suburb town of Kuala Kencana in which five to seven Papuans holding axes and one revolver, attacked ordinary (i.e., non-Satgas Pam) Freeport security guards and then fled the scene. According to eyewitness testimony, police arrested five people erroneously identified as the culprits and interrogated and tortured the detainees, forcing them to confess to the attack. Police stabbed one detainee in the head with a knife and forced him to claim that he was OPM. Prosecutors later rejected the police report on the grounds of insufficient evidence.
- the December 2001 shooting of two Freeport environmental unit employees at the Grasberg mine site. No investigation into the attack was conducted. The shootings were reportedly carried out by unidentified gunmen wearing military uniforms.
- an April 2002 attack by Kopassus against indigenous Papuan civilians in the lowland hamlet of Kali Kopi in which one civilian was killed and seven others were arrested and tortured.
Despite the fact that all of these cases had been reported to Freeport security, company management took no action to investigate and apprehend the groups perpetrating these crimes. It was in this atmosphere of total impunity that the August 31 attack took place.
(b) Chronology of the Shootings
At noon on the afternoon of Saturday, August 31, 2002, a convoy of trucks carrying teachers and children from Timika's International School was seen by two Freeport employees stopping at mile 62-63 on its way back to Tembagapura. Minutes later a Freeport employee and his wife arrived at the scene and, seeing the convoy under attack, quickly returned to the mile 64 security checkpoint to call for help. The shooting killed two American citizens and an Indonesian citizen, and injured 12 others. Directly following the shooting, the military blocked off the road between mile 50 and 64.
Decky Murib, an eyewitness to the attack and a former member of the TBO (Tenaga Bantuan Operasi or Operational Assistance Force, an indigenous Papuan civilian group enlisted by Indonesian Special Forces to assist with covert operations), has told ELSHAM investigators that Special Forces (Kopassus) members were involved in the shooting. Eye witnesses have also confirmed that a Freeport company vehicle from its Grasberg mining site arrived at the scene just prior to the attack. The vehicle was driven by a Freeport employee and was transporting members of the armed forces. According to standard Freeport policy, all company vehicles from the Grasberg site must be checked out, in writing. Review of vehicle documents from the morning of August 31 should provide important information about the perpetrators of the attack.
On the night of August 31, there was a meeting and agreement made between TNI and the police to patrol and protect the area of the shooting. The next day, Sunday, September 1, at 8:00am, while police were conducting a search of the area, they were fired on. They took cover and later, personnel from Kostrad 515 approached, claiming that they were guarding the ambush site and had just shot one of the alleged August 31 gunmen. The military brought the body of the victim, Elias Kwalik, to the side of the road, where police investigators took over the case. However, the results of a medical examination on Kwalik revealed that he had been dead for approximately 12 hours prior to the September 1 shooting, suggesting that the September 1 attack was fabricated and the body planted in an attempt to scapegoat the TPN/OPM. According to the medical examination, Kwalik also suffered from a disease that enlarged his testicles and would have made it impossible for him to participate in the August 31 attack. In addition, a Freeport employee informed ELSHAM investigators that he saw Kwalik at Mile 38 at 3:00pm on August 31, waiting for a ride, and had recommended to Kwalik that he return to Timika because of the military operations farther up the road.
On Thursday, September 12, at the request of Freeport Security to the Head of TNI for the Freeport area, Lieutenant Colonel Togap Gultom, military presence in the Freeport area was increased with the arrival of more troops.
On Friday, September 13, at approximately 3:00pm, a shooting occurred in the vicinity of mile 64, but there were no victims and the target was unknown.
At around 12:30pm on Saturday, September 14, there was gunfire in the area of mile 62 directed at a police and military convoy that was passing along the road. The police began to return fire towards the source of the shooting. The unidentified shooter wounded a Kostrad officer, who was part of the convoy. The same day, the police found undetonated explosives (generally used for underground mining operations) under a bridge at mile 58.
Reacting to this discovery, regional military commander Major General Mahidi Simbolon made a statement that, based on the evidence recovered from the site of the bridge (a surplus of ammunition left at the site, detonators and cable), TNI suspected a connection between Freeport management and the OPM. He backed this statement with information of internal problems within Freeport which could have caused an attack on the TNI. Recently there had been a re-structuring of Freeport security resulting in a change of power between Tom Green and Lexy Linturan which left Linturan in higher command. Simbolon suggested that there was also cooperation between Freeport, particularly Tom Green, and TPN/OPM guerrillas in the area and that he was sure that the August 31 shooting was carried out by the TPN/OPM.
Despite a lack of evidence, Indonesian military and governmental officials - as well as senior Freeport management - publicly attributed responsibility for the August 31 attack to the OPM. Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Ryamizard Rycudu made public statements denying any military involvement and suggesting that Kelly Kwalik's TPN/OPM group had been responsible for the attack because they are known for operations in the Freeport area. Minister for the Coordination of Political Affairs and Security Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono also later commented that the military and police in the Freeport area would take stern action and were stepping up operations against the groups responsible for the shooting, stressing that factions of the TPN/OPM were responsible and had to be wiped out.
Although no real and authentic evidence had been put forward, and before an effective investigation had been made, TNI had blamed the TPN/OPM and the local tribal communities for the shootings. Such unfounded allegations put the local community at risk of violent reprisals (e.g., arrests, torture, disappearance) by the military and intelligence agents and affected the objectivity of the investigation. The attack was clearly being used by military and government officials to justify violent action against the TPN/OPM as part of the wider governmental policy of wiping out so-called separatist movements.
In response to such accusations, Kelly Kwalik issued a statement on September 17 stating that he and his group were not responsible for the shooting, as all members were present in the group's village at the time of the attack. He reiterated his earlier statements that he had cancelled any plans to attack Freeport and reaffirmed his commitment to establishing Papua as a Zone of Peace.
(c) After the Shootings: Terror and Intimidation of Investigation Teams
In addition to the testimonies of Decky Murib and Freeport employees outlined above, military involvement in the August 31 shootings is also evidenced by military intelligence's efforts to terrorize and intimidate the police and civil society teams investigating the incident. ELSHAM and Timika-based police investigation teams have continued to receive death threats and been terrorized and intimidated by those suspected of being involved in the shooting of Freeport employees at mile 62-63 on August 31, 2002.
In the most disturbing occurrence, four members of ELSHAM's investigation team were almost killed after being attacked by residents of SP 9, who were provoked to attack by three military intelligence personnel. This attack occurred on the afternoon of Wednesday, September 15, when the ELSHAM team members attempted to approach a citizen for confirmation as to the whereabouts of the family of Elias Kwalik, the victim of the September 1 Freeport shooting incident.
The police also received death threats, were terrorized and received other forms of intimidation. On Sunday, September 1, a police officer was shot at by an army security officer, when the police attempted to approach the location of the August 31 shootings at mile 62-63. One week later, a police vehicle was attacked. Assailants threw stones and rocks, smashed the vehicle's windows, and pierced the tires with nails that they had placed on the road at mile 31.
Furthermore, members of the Kamoro community living near the SP 6 residential area have sought refuge in coastal areas because they were being terrorized and intimidated by masked black ninjas.
III. Freeport's Questionable Security Policy
(a) Criminal Acts by Security Forces Against Freeport itself
Not only have elements of the TNI attacked the local community, but investigations have also revealed that these units have stolen Freeport property. A number of crimes perpetrated by a unit of Kostrad 515, Tembagapura Police Sector, while they were on duty at Freeport in March and June 2002 include stealing:
- 6 tons of wire/filament from a factory at mile 74 that was later sold at the market price of 8,000 Rupiah (approximately US$1) per kilo
- Caterpillar trucks (estimated value 1.2 billion Rupiah or US$150,000) from a warehouse at mile 39 in mid-June 2002; and
- additional Freeport property from another warehouse.
From a business standpoint, these criminal activities by the company's security forces are extremely disadvantageous to Freeport shareholders' interests. However, although Freeport management is aware of these cases and reports have been made, the corporation has taken no legal action against the perpetrators.
Freeport's lack of responsiveness to criminal acts by security personnel, as outlined above, is further demonstrated by Freeport's role regarding human rights violations in 1994-5, in which the Indonesian armed forces killed or disappeared 16 civilians, raped five local women, and tortured and arbitrarily detained dozens of other local community members. A report from the Catholic Diocese of Jayapura and subsequent report of the National Commission of Human Rights confirmed the violations. While four low-ranking soldiers were convicted of procedural violations by a military tribunal in connection with one of these incidents, there has been no action taken by the Indonesian government to bring the other perpetrators to justice. While corporate management publicly stated concern about the abuses on several occasions, Freeport continued and augmented its relationship with the Indonesian military.
In fact, since 1995, Freeport officials have claimed that Freeport's Contract of Work (COW) with the Indonesian government actually requires the company to provide logistical support to the Indonesian military and police. However, none of the company's COWs includes any such explicit stipulation suggesting that Freeport's financial and logistical support to the Indonesian armed forces has no legal basis.
Freeport's continual failure to act in response to human rights violations and other violent attacks in the lead up to the August 31 shootings, and even more interestingly, its failure to respond to criminal activities of the security forces against its own business interests, calls into question Freeport's security policy and its commitment to the protection of its employees and human rights more generally.
IV. Vested Interests
(a) Freeport and the Indonesian and U.S. Governments
In last year alone, Freeport made a profit of US$ 1.9 billion, which represents 47 percent of Papua's Gross Domestic Product. Of that total, roughly 7 percent or $130 million was paid in taxes to the Indonesian government, making Freeport Indonesia's biggest tax contributor. PT Freeport Indonesia, the Freeport subsidiary in which the Indonesian government holds approximately a 10 percent stake, owns a 20 percent share of the mine, while the U.S.-based Freeport McMoRan owns 80 percent. Presumably, the U.S. government also profits from taxes paid by the U.S. mining giant.
The two major political parties in the U.S. also benefit from corporate campaign contributions by Freeport. Indeed, Freeport reportedly has sought to increase its influence with U.S. government officials through its campaign contributions. An apparent link between OPIC's 1996 temporary reinstatement of Freeport's political risk insurance (through December 1996) and Freeport contributions to the Democratic National Committee is troubling and warrants further investigation.
According to a February 1997 article in the Austin Chronicle, sources close to OPIC stated that, after the agency reinstated Freeport's political risk insurance, then-OPIC President Ruth Harkin -- who is married to U.S. Senator Tom Harkin (a Democrat from Iowa) -- stated that she had persuaded Freeport's Chief Executive Officer James Robert ("Jim Bob") Moffett to contribute $100,000 to the Democratic National Committee (DNC).
As cited in the Austin Chronicle piece, according to U.S. Federal Election Commission documents, Freeport-McMoRan gave the DNC $40,000 on August 26, 1996. On September 6, 1996, the wives of Freeport's top executives, Chief Financial Officer Richard Adkerson, vice chairman Rene Latiolais, and Chief Investment Officer Charles Goodyear, wrote checks to the DNC totaling $35,000. Four days later, Mr. Moffett's wife Louise wrote a check to the DNC for $2,500, bringing the total amount of contributions by Freeport spouses to $77,500 within a two-week period.
Based on figures from U.S. Federal Election Commission records, Freeport placed second in total financial contributions from the U.S. mining industry to U.S. elections during the 1999-2000 election cycle. Freeport's contributions were $262,703, $53 less than the top contributor.
Financially, there is much at stake for Freeport itself, as well as the Indonesian and U.S. governments.
(b) Military Interests
Since 1996, Freeport's operational costs for military and police forces (military barracks, offices, etc.) has amounted to US$34,839,137.37 or Rupiah 278,713,098,960. This amount is divided among five groups: TNI, Police, Security, Government Relations and the Community Liaison Office. Each of these groups has its own operational costs code. The military has vested interests in maintaining its presence in the Freeport mining area. Only 25 percent of the military's operational budget is covered by the Indonesian government, with the remaining 75 percent raised by the military itself using a number of legal and illegal methods, including trafficking in stolen goods and endangered species. Freeport represents a major source of income for the military in meeting its budget deficit. It is unclear how Freeport's auditor, the firm of Arthur Andersen, has accounted for the company's expenditures to the military and police.
The final results of the ELSHAM investigation, confirmed by police also investigating the August 31 shootings, indicate that TPN/OPM members were not involved in the shooting of Freeport employees. The Indonesian armed forces' history of instituting destabilizing violence in the area, the circumstances surrounding the August 31 shootings, weaponry and ammunition used, and the fact that one of the supposed attackers was dead at least 12 hours prior to his "capture" by the military, all suggest that the shootings were carried out by Indonesian military personnel or groups facilitated by the TNI, who up until now have been entrusted with protecting the security and stability of the Freeport area.
The shootings at mile 62-63 can be seen as part of the strategy of certain elements from the Indonesian security forces to maintain their presence in the Freeport mining area and to protect or bolster their income from providing security to the mine. Furthermore, the attack can be seen as an effort by the military to justify strong and violent action against the TPN/OPM to attempt to wipe out the separatist movement, as part of the wider policy of the Indonesian government.
However, the police investigation up until this point has focused on the perpetrators of the shootings as individuals and has not considered an investigation of the relationship between the shootings and the command structures within the military and Freeport security systems, or the wider state policies of the Indonesian government. ELSHAM is concerned that this case will be dealt with in the same manner as the November 2001 assassination of Papuan leader Theys Eluay, which has resulted in the trial of Kopassus soldiers as individuals before a military tribunal, with no investigation into the decision-makers who ordered the killing or the state policies of which the killing was a result.
Unless the policies of the Indonesian central government and Freeport Security are investigated, human rights violations and attacks of this nature will continue with impunity.
Because of the increase in threats, terror and intimidation surrounding the investigation, ELSHAM staff and volunteers, witnesses and survivors of the attack have to be protected.
Given the fact that two American citizens were killed in the attack and that Freeport McMoRan, the majority shareholder of the mining interest, is a publicly held and traded U.S.-based corporation, ELSHAM calls on the U.S. government, in cooperation with the Indonesian government, to undertake its own investigation into the shootings at mile 62-63, Tembagapura.
In the wake of Arthur Andersen accounting scandals plaguing U.S. corporations - and the consequent fall in share prices and severe damage to shareholders - ELSHAM also believes that it is in the best interest of Freeport shareholders that the appropriate U.S. government agencies investigate:
- Freeport's accounting practices, including its financial support to the Indonesian armed forces; and
- Freeport's practice of impunity towards criminal acts against its personnel, property and the local population.
 See, for example, "Development Aggression: Observations on Human Rights Conditions in the PT Freeport Indonesia Contract of Work Areas With Recommendations," Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, Washington, July 2002; "Mission to Indonesia and East Timor on the Issue of Violence Against Women, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences," UN Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.3 (January 21, 1999); "Report of the Visit of the Working Group to Indonesia (January 31 to February 12, 1999)," UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, UN Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.2 (July 5, 1999); "Results of Monitoring and Investigating of Five Incidents at Timika and One Incident at Hoea, Irian Jaya During October 1994-June 1995," National Human Rights Commission of Indonesia, Jakarta, September 1995; "Violations of Human Rights in the Timika Area of Irian Jaya, Indonesia," Catholic Church of Jayapura, 1995; "Human Rights Violations and Disaster in Bela, Alama, Jila and Mapnduma," Indonesian Evangelical Church (Mimika, Irian Jaya), the Catholic Church Three Kings Parish (Timika, Irian Jaya), and the Christian Evangelical Church of Mimika, 1998; "Incidents of Military Violence Against Indigenous Women in Irian Jaya (West Papua), Indonesia," RFK Center for Human Rights and the Institute for Human Rights Studies and Advocacy, Washington/Jayapura, 1999; LEMASA, "The Amungme Tribal Council's Resolution on the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its Implementation on Papuan Soil," Timika, December 10, 1998; Survival International, "Rio Tinto Critic Gagged," Survival International, London, 1998; Robert Bryce, "Plaintiffs in Freeport Suit Are Harassed," Austin Chronicle, September 27, 1996; and LEMASA, "The Indonesian Armed Forces in Timika Forcefully Took Away the People's Document," Timika, August 14, 1996; and "Timika: Where's Mama?" Tempo, Regions 27/I, March 13-19, 2001.
 For details, see "Repressive Mining in West Papua," A. Abrash and D. Kennedy, in Moving Mountains: Communities Confront Mining and Globalization, Mineral Policy Institute and Otford Press, Sydney, 2001.
 National Human Rights Commission of Indonesia, "Results of Monitoring and Investigating of Five Incidents at Timika and One Incident at Hoea, Irian Jaya During October 1994-June 1995," Jakarta, 1995. In addition, commissioners involved in the investigation have called it incomplete for failing to examine involvement in the violations by Freeport itself. See "Freeport's Involvement has not yet been Investigated," Kompas, 2 October 1995 (English translation of original in Bahasa Indonesia; source: TAPOL).
 TPN is the Tentara Pembebasan Nasional or National Liberation Army; OPM is the Organisasi Papua Merdeka or Free Papua Organization. First as the OPM and then adopting the TPN title, these small regionally based freedom fighter units have been waging low-level defense activities aimed at pushing the Indonesian armed forces out of Papua. The units, armed mainly with traditional bows, arrows and spears, have no history of TPN/OPM killings of foreigners of European descent.
 In an interview with a researcher, former Indonesian Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono confirmed that "elements within the military had incited the unrest experienced by Freeport in order to highlight the benefits of their presence." See "Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business," L. McCulloch, presented to The International Conference on Soldiers in Business: Military as an Economic Actor, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Jakarta, 2000. See also, Appendix V, "Final Report: Amungme Baseline Study." Universitas Cenderawasih-Australian National University Baseline Studies Project, Universitas Cenderawasih and the Australian National University, 1998.
 Maj. Gen. Mahidi Simbolon, who assumed the position of commander of the Trikora military command in Jayapura in January 2001, is a member of Kopassus, the army's elite commandos. He has had no fewer than six tours of duty in East Timor, starting with Operasi Seroja, the invasion of the territory in December 1975. Like all Kopassus officers serving in East Timor, Simbolon played an active role in SGI, the special Kopassus unit designed for counter-insurgency, whose local command posts were used to torture captured East Timorese. He graduated from the military academy in 1974. He and many of his class-mates have distinguished themselves as 'East Timor veterans' whose military careers have been greatly enhance by their many operational tours of duty in East Timor.
Simbolon led the unit that arrested Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao (now President of East Timor), in 1992, for which Simbolon was given a special promotion from major to colonel. The climax of his East Timor experience came in 1995 when he served for two years as commander of the Wira Dharma Korem in charge of East Timor. Then, until 1999, he was chief of staff at the Udayana military command based in Bali, the command in overall control of East Timor. The Udayana commander at that time was the notorious Major-General Adam Damiri. It was during the commandership of these two generals in Bali that Operasi Sapu Jagad, was launched, an operation whose main purpose was to create, recruit and finance the many militia units that spearheaded the army's campaign of violence before, during and after the UN-supervised ballot. This operation was responsible for the widespread destruction and killings of hundreds of civilians that climaxed in September 1999, after the ballot result was announced on 4 September. One of the militia units, Mahidi, an acronym meaning 'dead or alive with integration', was actually named after Simbolon.
In the wake of the Indonesian military's November 2001 assassination of nonviolent Papuan leader Theys Eluay and other severe human rights violations, all signs suggest that Simbolon's command in Papua has resulted in an intensification of the use of intelligence operations which he practiced during his many years of service in East Timor.
 Rumors about vampire sightings, spread amongst local community members, have presaged other violent military attacks in Indonesia and appear to be a psychological operations tactic designed to create an atmosphere of terror and to destabilize communities in advance of a specific military operation. For example, rumors of a vampire sighting spread throughout the Papuan town of Abepura in the week preceding Kopassus personnel's assassination of Papuan leader Theys Eluay on November 10, 2001.
 Laskar Jihad is a radical Muslim group that has carried out extreme acts of violence against Christians in Indonesia's Maluku province, reportedly with the backing of the Indonesian military; the Red and White (Merah Putih) militias are similar to the pro-Jakarta militias established in East Timor by the Indonesian military prior to the 1999 independence referendum there and which unleashed a violent onslaught against civilians, killing hundreds and destroying an estimated two-thirds of the territory's infrastructure. The Satgas Pam is a 550-member unit, comprised of personnel from the Indonesian Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police, that is tasked with guarding Freeport's mining operation. The Satgas Pam reports directly to armed forces commanders in Jakarta.
 Mr. Linturan gained notoriety in 1994-95, during the period of the military's intensified human rights violations against indigenous Papuans in the Freeport operations area. He is widely acknowledged to have worked closely with the military in carrying out those attacks, and as a result of community protests, Freeport management transferred him to PT Freeport Indonesia's Jakarta office. He now has been promoted to the position of PT Freeport Indonesia's Security Manager.
 Early in August 2002, Papua provincial police commander I Made Pastika had announced the launch of Operation Adil Matoa, widely understood to be part of the Indonesian central government's stated aim of cracking down on "separatists."
 Along with the highland Amungme community, one of the two indigenous Papuan tribes who were the original landowners in the area and who have since been internally displaced by Freeport's mining operations. Kamoro and Amungme community leaders have protested against Freeport's operations on their lands for decades, including petition letters to and meetings with Freeport senior management, Indonesian civil and military authorities, U.S. government executive and legislative branch officials, United Nations personnel, and Freeport shareholders and financial backers. The communities also joined in two 1996 lawsuits brought by community leaders Tom Beanal and Yosepha Alomang against Freeport in the U.S. federal and Louisiana state court systems, respectively.
 See statement of Paul Murphy, then-Vice-President of Freeport Indonesia, quoted in Matt Richards, Freeport in Indonesia: Reconciling Development and Indigenous Rights, Report on a Public Forum at the Gorman House Arts Centre, Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Canberra,1996.
 See the Open Secrets Database of the Center for Responsive Politics, online at: www.opensecrets.org. The website lists campaign contributions by Political Action Committees, soft-money donors, and individuals giving US$200 or more. Lisa Sumi at the Environmental Mining Council of British Columbia compiled the figures regarding the U.S. mining industry contributions.
Lembaga Studi Dan Advokasi Hak Asisi Manusia
Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy
Jln. Kampus ISTP - Padang Bulan, Jayapura - Papua
Tel/Fax: 62-(0)967-581600/ 581520;